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 INNOVATION, INFORMATION, AND THE POVERTY 
OF NATIONS* 
ROBERT COOTER** 
ABSTRACT 
 Sustained growth occurs in developing nations through improve-
ments in markets and organizations. Entrepreneurial innovation re-
sembles biological mutation that is unpredictable before it occurs and 
understandable afterwards. It is unpredictable because it begins with 
the innovator possessing private information by which he earns ex-
traordinary profits. It is understandable because it ends with the pub-
lic figuring out the innovation and profits approaching the ordinary 
rate of return. These characteristics of innovation have important con-
sequences for law and policy to foster economic growth. Specifically, 
government officials who rely on public information cannot predict 
which firms or industries will experience rapid growth. Consequently, 
industrial policies that promote growth are unlikely to succeed. Pro-
ponents of industrial policy today make the same mistake as the mer-
cantilists whose interventions Adam Smith attacked as a cause of na-
tional poverty. In contrast, secure property and contract rights, as well 
as effective business law (especially the laws regulating financial 
markets), create conditions under which competition naturally pro-
duces entrepreneurial innovation and nations become rich. The main 
obstacle to sustained economic growth in poor countries today is inef-
fective civil law. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 What explains the poverty of nations? In the conditions of the 
modern world, defective law causes national poverty. Lawyers distin-
guish between law that controls behavior (law-in-practice) and writ-
ten law (law-on-the-books). When I speak of “law,” I mean law that 
controls behavior, not law that is merely written down. Law that con-
                                                                                                                      
 * This Article is based on the Mason Ladd Lecture delivered at the Florida State 
University College of Law in January 2005. The author and Has Bernd Schaefer are ex-
panding these ideas into a book entitled Law and the Poverty of Nations. 
 ** Herman Selvin Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. 
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trols behavior becomes part of the routines followed by organizations 
and individuals. When organizations and individuals routinely follow 
laws, these laws become institutionalized.  
 A nation’s wealth comes from the productivity of its citizens, 
which depends on resources, technology, and organization. In the 
past, the uneven distribution of natural resources condemned some 
countries to poverty. Because of vast improvements in technology, 
nations can now overcome poor natural resources with good technol-
ogy and organization. By the end of the last century, the absence of 
major wars, the collapse of communism, the lowering of tariffs, and 
falling transportation costs removed most obstacles to exchanging 
goods and ideas among nations. Consequently, the international ob-
stacles to acquiring technology are mostly gone. Whereas nations can 
exchange goods and ideas, they must develop organizations. By de-
veloping productive organizations, all nations can escape poverty.  
 Within a sound legal framework, productive organizations develop 
naturally from competition among people. People feel intense rivalry 
over wealth. To gain wealth, people and organizations can either 
make it or take it from others. An economy grows when rivalry 
among people directs them to make wealth. Enrichment proceeds as 
people compete to improve the productivity of their organizations. 
Good legal institutions provide a framework of competition for mak-
ing wealth that enriches the nation. Conversely, an economy fails 
when rivalry among people directs them to take wealth from others. 
When some people take wealth from others by legal or illegal means, 
potential victims try to protect themselves. Offensive and defensive 
tactics divert efforts away from production. Defective legal institu-
tions provide opportunities for taking wealth from others and impov-
erish the nation.  
 Like compound interest on a debt, sustained growth moves faster 
than the popular imagination can grasp. The question of whether 
growth is faster in rich or poor nations will determine whether living 
standards in the world converge or diverge. If poor nations grow sig-
nificantly faster than rich nations, the gap between them will close 
surprisingly quickly. Conversely, if rich nations grow significantly 
faster than poor nations, the gap between them will widen surpris-
ingly quickly. In fact, no general pattern exists for poor countries to 
catch up or fall further behind. Instead, some poor countries have 
grown faster than some rich countries, thus closing the gap, and 
some rich countries have grown faster than some poor countries, thus 
widening the gap. 
 To illustrate, at the beginning of the last century, England was 
richer per capita than Japan, and at the end of the last century Ja-
pan was richer than England. In 1900 Argentina’s wealth per capita 
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resembled the United States, whereas northern Italy was poorer. To-
day, northern Italy is richer than the United States, and Argentina is 
poorer. If current performances continue, China will achieve a posi-
tion in the world by 2025 that is unimaginable today for most people, 
whereas most African nations will fall significantly farther behind.1  
 I begin by analyzing the innovation process. First, I will explain 
that economic growth unites information and capital, which is inher-
ently difficult. Next, I will connect innovation to public policy. Gov-
ernment officials who rely on public information cannot predict which 
firms or industries will experience rapid growth. Consequently, in-
dustrial policies that promote growth are unlikely to succeed. Propo-
nents of industrial policy today make the same mistake as the mer-
cantilists whose interventions Adam Smith attacked as a cause of na-
tional poverty. Industrial policy cannot unite information and capital. 
Finally, I explain that law provides the framework to unite informa-
tion and capital. Secure property and contract rights, as well as effec-
tive business law (especially the laws regulating financial markets), 
create conditions under which competition naturally produces inno-
vation and nations become rich. Conversely, systematic defects in the 
legal institutions of poor countries retard innovation and keep coun-
tries poor. 
II.   SEPARATION OF INFORMATION AND CAPITAL 
 To begin analyzing innovation, consider two examples. First, an 
economist who works at a Boston investment bank received a letter 
that read, “I know how your bank can make $10 million. If you give 
me $1 million, I will tell you.” The letter concisely illustrates the 
separation of information and capital in the process of innovation: 
the bank does not want to pay for information without first determin-
ing its worth, and the innovator fears to disclose information to the 
bank without first being paid. Second, a Berkeley mathematician in-
vented bibliographic software called Endnote, which many people 
now have on their computers. In the early stage of developing this 
product, his hope and fear was to receive a call from Microsoft. The 
hope was that Microsoft would examine Endnote and decide to buy 
his company, thus making him rich. The fear was that Microsoft 
would examine Endnote and decide to build a competing product, 
thus bankrupting Endnote. Like the Boston bank, Microsoft would 
not pay for information without determining its worth, and after ob-
taining the information it would have less need to buy it.  
                                                                                                                      
 1.  Gross domestic product per person in sub-Sahara Africa has declined since 1975, 
roughly by the order of twenty-five percent. The $25 Billion Question—Aid to Africa, 
ECONOMIST, July 2, 2005, at 24-26. 
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 These two examples illustrate the problem of make-or-take ap-
plied to innovation. To stimulate innovations, people who make them 
must get paid. To develop innovations into marketable products, in-
novators must disclose information to investors so they can evaluate 
it. After the information is revealed to them, the investors may take 
it and not pay for it.   
 Further, these two examples concern innovations by an independ-
ent person. The problem of the separation of information from capital 
persists when the innovator is an employee of a large firm. Contract-
ing to incentivize employees to innovate encounters similar problems 
as contracting to finance an independent innovator. To incentivize 
employees, the firm must give the innovating employee a secure right 
to a significant fraction of the value created by the innovation. Draft-
ing an employment contract to achieve this result is difficult, partly 
because innovations are difficult to describe or value before they oc-
cur. The employment contract, consequently, seldom guarantees the 
innovating employee a significant fraction of the value created by the 
innovation. As a result, the employee may not fully use his creative 
powers for the firm, or the employee may try to leave the firm and 
take his innovation with him.  
 To analyze the separation of information from capital, I will ex-
plain some principles of the economics of information. Economists 
distinguish information into two kinds—public and private. Public 
information is available to everyone who seeks it. To illustrate, gen-
eral principles of science are published in books and taught in 
schools. In contrast, private information is available only to a few 
people. For example, the recipe for Coca-Cola is a commercial secret.  
 When an innovator makes a discovery, he acquires valuable in-
formation that is private because only a few people know about it. 
Useful information that remains private gives the innovator a com-
petitive advantage against his rivals. The prospect of exceptional 
profits draws people to use their energy and creativity to innovate. 
Exceptional profits, however, also attract competitors who try to 
learn what the innovator knows. As competitors come to understand 
what the innovator knows, the innovator’s private information be-
comes public. In general, competition converts valuable private in-
formation into public information. This is true for recipes, machine 
designs, computer programs, organizational methods, and market 
opportunities.  
 The tendency to convert valuable private information into public 
information creates a characteristic life cycle of organizations. First, 
someone innovates and obtains capital to develop the innovation. An 
established firm with ample capital may employ the innovator, or the 
innovator may form a new firm and find outside investors. If the in-
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novation is useful, the innovator’s organization enjoys exceptional 
profits and expands faster than its competitors. In this stage, only a 
few people understand the innovation. Second, competitors begin to 
discover what the innovator knows, which erodes the innovator’s 
profits and slows the growth of the innovator’s organization. Third, 
competitors fully assimilate the innovation, the innovator’s profits re-
turn to normal, and the organization stops expanding faster than its 
competitors. In this life cycle, the innovator understands the innova-
tion in the first stage, the innovators and some competitors under-
stand it in the second stage, and the public understands it in the 
third stage.  
 These three stages in the development of an innovation corre-
spond roughly to the three stages of finance for a start-up firm in 
Silicon Valley. According to a popular quip, the first stage of funding 
start-up firms comes from “the 3 F’s”: family, friends, and fools. 
These “angel investors” rely partly on personal relationships that fos-
ter trust between innovator and investor. Consequently, I refer to the 
first stage as “relational finance.”  
 Most innovators, however, have too few personal relationships to 
achieve the scale necessary to finance an innovation’s development. 
After initial funding by the 3 F’s, the second stage of funding comes 
from “venture capitalists,” who are not family, friends, or fools. Ven-
ture capitalists are experts at ascertaining risks in the early stages of 
an innovation’s development. Venture capitalists are also experts at 
organizing start-ups to extract full value from them. Unlike rela-
tional finance, venture capital is a form of private finance.  
 In Silicon Valley, lawyers are intermediaries between innovators 
and venture capitalists, and lawyers are also venture capitalists. To 
illustrate, the largest Silicon Valley law firm (Wilson Sonsini Good-
rich & Rosati) routinely accepts payment from start-ups in the form 
of preferred shares and deferred debt. Collection of debt is deferred 
until a “significant capital event,” which consists of an initial public 
offering or the acquisition of the start-up by an established company. 
If the start-up fails, the shares and debt are worthless, so the law 
firm is paid nothing.  
 In the third stage, a successful start-up offers its stock to the pub-
lic. To comply with the rules of the Securities Exchange Commission, 
a firm that makes an initial public offering must divulge much pri-
vate information about itself to the public. Thus, the third stage is 
public finance. The movement in financing from relational to private 
to public moves information from private to public. As information 
diffuses, the risk decreases and the expected profit rate falls towards 
an ordinary rate of return. 
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III.   POLICY FOR GROWTH? 
 Innovation involves discovering something new. In order to fore-
see the future of science and technology, it is necessary to know what 
has not yet been discovered. Discovery and foresight are substan-
tially inconsistent. Besides developments in science and technology, 
innovation in markets and business organization are unforeseeable 
for another reason—strategy. In some simple games like tic-tac-toe, 
an intelligent person can calculate all the possible moves and coun-
termoves and play out the entire contest in his mind. These games 
have a predictable outcome for intelligent players, which is why intel-
ligent people seldom play them. In other games like poker, calculat-
ing all the possible moves is too difficult, and the players decrease 
their predictability by bluffing and randomizing. In poker, a player’s 
move is unpredictable before it occurs and understandable after-
wards. In this respect, business competition resembles poker. For 
each move there is a countermove. The most successful strategy is 
the one that is hardest to counter, and the hardest move to counter is 
unforeseen.  
 Since discovery begins as private information, people with public 
information cannot foresee which organizations will innovate, become 
more productive, and grow faster than their competitors. The growth 
of competing economic organizations is inevitably unpredictable for 
the public, including most experts and officials of the state. However, 
after the cycle of growth is complete and the private information be-
comes public, the public can understand why the innovator’s organi-
zation grew so fast.  
 In this respect, organizations resemble mutations. Biologists can 
seldom predict when mutations will occur or how far successful mu-
tants will expand. After expansion stops, however, the biologists can 
understand what occurred. To illustrate, biologists did not predict the 
appearance and spread of the SARS virus. As the pace of the SARS 
epidemic slowed, however, scientists increasingly understood its ori-
gins and why it spread as it did. Similarly, economists cannot predict 
which economic organizations will grow in a competitive system, but 
economists can understand why an economic organization grew 
faster than its competitors after it stops doing so.  
 The unpredictability of business innovation has important impli-
cations for the laws and policies needed to foster economic growth. In 
many states, public officials proclaim the goal of economic growth 
and manipulate markets to achieve it. Manipulations involve taxes, 
subsidies, tariffs, licenses, and regulations. These manipulations are 
called “industrial policy,” because state policy guides industrial de-
velopment, or “technology policy,” because state policy guides techno-
logical development. With industrial and technology policy, state offi-
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cials choose the business organizations that grow. Officials thus pick 
the winners and losers among firms and industries. 
 With some exceptions, public officials have performed dismally in 
channeling investments to enhance growth. To illustrate, in the last 
half of the twentieth century many poor countries pursued industrial 
policies that favored manufacturing over agriculture, heavy industry 
over light industry, dirty industry over clean industry, fishing and 
cutting wood over sustainable production, and domestic consumption 
over exports. Most economists view these policies as mistakes that 
slowed economic growth.  
 Industrial policy also performed dismally in wealthy countries. 
For example, inflation-adjusted oil prices increased sharply from the 
mid-1970s until 1980, and then fell back to the previous low levels 
where they remained until turning up again in 2002. In spite of 
twenty years of price stability, U.S. officials used the fear of rising oil 
prices to justify large tax breaks for oil extraction and direct subsi-
dies for uneconomic extraction of oil from shale. Predictions of rising 
oil prices by public officials proved wrong, whereas the predictions by 
private investors who were risking their own money in futures mar-
kets proved right. Oil policy throughout this period involved a mas-
sive waste of U.S. taxpayers’ money for private gain.  
 The failure of industrial policy to stimulate economic growth has 
two causes. The first cause is motivation. The motivation of public of-
ficials to make wealth for the nation is weak, because they cannot 
keep it. Public officials, however, can keep the wealth that they re-
ceive in salaries or bribes. By steering industrial development, offi-
cials increase their responsibilities and justify higher salaries, and 
they also increase their opportunities for bribes. Industrial policy is 
rife with political favoritism, chicanery, cronyism, and corruption. 
Even so, some people convince themselves that politicians and offi-
cials will make more wealth using other people’s money than private 
investors can make using their own money. 
 The second cause of industrial policy failure is lack of information. 
Even if officials were motivated to make wealth for the nation, they 
do not have the information needed to guide industrial development. 
The life cycle of an innovation explains the lack of information. In the 
first phase of the life cycle, innovators discover private information, 
which only becomes public at the end of the life cycle when rapid 
growth ceases. Consequently, public officials cannot predict growth 
rates of competing organizations. 
 Empirical studies in finance confirm this prediction. Specifically, 
they demonstrate that investors who only possess public information 
cannot do better than chance when trying to invest in companies that 
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will grow.2 This demonstration, whose technical name is the “efficient 
market hypothesis,” explains why few economists are rich. Econo-
mists study the economy by using mostly public information, so they 
cannot do better than chance in picking successful companies. This 
demonstration also suggests that many investors have paid large 
commissions for worthless information. This realization has caused 
dramatic changes in the way many private investors manage their 
portfolios. “Churning” refers to wasteful and unnecessary trading 
that generates commissions for managers without increasing profits 
for investors. Instead of paying investment advisors to pick growth 
stocks, private investors who have studied finance tend to favor “pas-
sive” mutual funds, meaning funds whose managers buy a diverse 
portfolio of stocks and hold it.  
 Just as private investors cannot profit by trading on public infor-
mation except by chance, so public officials cannot accelerate growth 
by industrial policies except by chance. Like a broker who churns a 
client’s portfolio, policies that allegedly redirect capital to growth in-
dustries mostly waste resources without increasing growth rates. The 
waste comes from using taxes to pay public officials to engage in un-
productive activities, from businesses paying lobbyists to influence 
the officials, and from paying bribes.  
 Officials who act on public information do more harm than good 
when they try to solve the problem of separation of information and 
capital. What about acting on private information? Some people, such 
as investment bankers, have private information and use it to chan-
nel investments into organizations that will grow quickly. By per-
forming this role, investment bankers increase the rate of the econ-
omy’s growth. Like investment bankers, should public officials use 
private information to make economic decisions?  
 Allowing public officials to invest in particular firms or industries 
based on private information carries large risks for the nation. Much 
like diplomatic maneuvers in foreign affairs, public investment based 
on private information involves secrecy. Secret policies preclude pub-
lic discussion, debate, and criticism, which are necessary to dampen 
nepotism, favoritism, cronyism, and corruption in economic policy. 
Officials who pursue secret economic policies can divert wealth to 
friends and cronies for private purposes. Requiring officials to ex-
plain and justify their policies by using public information creates a 
basis for accountability. Consequently, the citizens in democracies of-
ten expect officials to base economic policies on public information.  
                                                                                                                      
 2. According to the efficient market hypothesis, market prices incorporate all public 
information, so no one investor can do better than chance when relying on public informa-
tion. This is the “semistrong” form of the efficient market hypothesis.  
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 We have explained that state officials, like private investors, can-
not generally identify growth industries based on public information, 
and allowing state officials to make economic decisions based on pri-
vate information invites corruption. In some circumstances, however, 
public officials have successfully used private information to make 
investment decisions. For example, the best and brightest staff Ko-
rea’s Ministry of Finance and Japan’s MITI. As part of their esprit de 
corps, these officials have mutual understanding and trust that allow 
them to share information with each other. In the second half of the 
twentieth century, ministries in Korea and Japan selected industries 
and firms to expand, directed capital to them, and actively manipu-
lated markets. During this period, these two countries enjoyed rapid 
economic growth. 
 Perhaps state leadership in development was desirable in Japan 
immediately after World War II and in Korea immediately after the 
Korean War. At the time, capital markets were much weaker then 
than today. In addition, the development plan in these countries fol-
lowed a logical progression that made sense and did not require pri-
vate information. The logical progression first developed relatively 
basic manufacturing industries (for example, textiles and steel) and 
then proceeded to more complex goods (for example, cars and elec-
tronics). 
 Whether state activism caused rapid growth in Korea and Japan 
or merely coincided with it is disputed. By directing investment, 
MITI may have caused Japanese firms to flourish in the 1950s and 
1960s, or MITI may have simply participated in a rapidly rising 
market without contributing to that rise. To illustrate the latter 
view, a recent article argues that MITI did not have a political man-
date to direct growth in Japan, and it never did so. According to that 
article, the claims to the contrary were often made by self-interested 
officials and Marxist social scientists who poorly understood mar-
kets.3 The experience of Taiwan provides support for this conclusion. 
Taiwan, which is similar in some important ways to Korea and Ja-
pan, experienced rapid economic growth with less state interference 
and direction.  
IV.   WHEN LARGER IS BETTER 
 Development economics has a long history of defending industrial 
policy based on scale of production. The scale of production affects 
average cost. Starting with a very small company, the average cost of 
production usually falls as the size of a company increases. Before 
production is economical and the company becomes competitive, its 
                                                                                                                      
 3. Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Capitalist Politicians, Socialist Bureaucrats? 
Legends of Government Planning from Japan, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 595 (2003). 
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size must reach a certain minimum level, called the “minimum effi-
cient scale.” For example, an innovator who develops a new computer 
chip usually has to achieve a minimum level of production before the 
average cost falls to a level that attracts customers.  
 Starting a successful company requires obtaining enough financ-
ing to achieve the minimum efficient scale of production. The finan-
cial requirements vary greatly from one business to another. The 
minimum scale for selling fruit from a cart on the street is small, and 
the minimum scale for manufacturing televisions is large. In some 
very special cases, the minimum scale is extremely large. These are 
situations where returns to scale continue to increase even after the 
business is very large. To illustrate, designing large commercial air-
planes is so expensive that the world probably has room only for a 
few manufacturers.  
 Given increasing returns to the scale of production, a minimum 
size is necessary for a firm or industry to be profitable, and in some 
circumstances private capital markets cannot provide sufficient 
funds to reach the minimum size needed for profitability. Many de-
velopment economists thought that poor countries fit within these 
circumstances. According to this view, private companies in rich 
countries already exceed the minimum size for profitability, whereas 
business organizations in poor countries remain below the minimum 
size for profitability. Consequently, firms in poor countries need state 
assistance to grow to an efficient scale. Assistance was organized 
through public law, which directed the economy.  
 The “public law approach” to economic development gives a cen-
tral place to administrative and regulatory law. The public law ap-
proach imagines that state officials can direct the economy by enact-
ing laws that do not follow business practice. As officials lead the 
economy under this approach, the market follows the officials. Until 
recently, the public law approach dominated development economics. 
In rejecting the public law approach, I also reject the dominant tradi-
tion in development economics.  
 Usually, private capital markets can supply sufficient funds for 
new companies to achieve the minimum size required for profitabil-
ity. In some circumstances, however, the minimum size is so large 
that private capital markets strain to supply enough money. In these 
circumstances, a bureaucratic elite can use public money to supple-
ment or replace private money. To illustrate, the European Union 
created the Airbus consortium to achieve sufficient size to compete 
with the Boeing Company, which is a very large U.S. company. Euro-
pean governments heavily subsidized the creation of Airbus, but once 
it achieved a prominent position in world markets, the consortium 
was privatized and the subsidies were allegedly removed. Airbus and 
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Boeing often trade accusations that their governments clandestinely 
subsidize the other firm in violation of the World Trade Organiza-
tion’s rules.  
 Was the European Union prudent to use state funds to create Air-
bus? Commentators disagree. Perhaps Airbus is one of those excep-
tional cases of a good investment that is too large for the private 
market to finance. Or perhaps Airbus is an uneconomic folly, like the 
supersonic airplane the Concorde. The Concorde, whose commercial 
service began in 1976 and effectively ended with a deadly crash in 
Paris in 2000, set speed records for commercial aircraft but never 
came close to recouping the massive development costs paid by Great 
Britain and France. In any case, investment banks rarely encounter 
profitable opportunities that are too large for private finance, 
whereas governments often undertake massive public investments 
like the Concorde that are too unprofitable to attract private inves-
tors.  
 The argument for Airbus is the same one that development 
economists used to justify state-led growth in developing countries. 
The basic idea is that unprofitable companies and industries in de-
veloping countries would turn profitable by increasing sufficiently in 
size. To get these companies and industries to the minimum efficient 
scale, the state provided subsidies and tariff protection. Public offi-
cials in many developing countries have channeled state subsidies to 
preferred industries, and outside of Southeast Asia, these industries 
have performed dismally. The argument that subsidies to companies 
and industries will cause them to grow enough to turn profitable 
seems no more true in poor countries than in rich countries.  
 Although industrial or technology policy is unlikely to succeed, 
state officials can sometimes identify profitable investments of an-
other kind. Industry needs infrastructure such as roads, water, elec-
tricity, airports, harbors, and industrial parks. Infrastructure devel-
opment often requires large tracts of land owned by different people. 
By using the power of eminent domain, the state can overcome the 
problem of holdouts and assemble the necessary land. The large scale 
of these projects and the coordination problems created by them 
sometimes require the state to take the lead. Whereas a successful 
industrial policy would require private information, the state can 
successfully build infrastructure by relying on public information.  
V.   LAW FOR GROWTH  
 In rich and poor countries, industrial or technology policy cannot 
increase the pace of economic growth except by chance. Conse-
quently, the state plays an indirect role in stimulating innovation 
and growth, primarily by supplying infrastructure and a good legal 
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framework. Having discussed infrastructure briefly, I return to the 
central topic of the legal framework for innovation. Financing inno-
vation requires some degree of trust between innovator and investor. 
Trust is required because each one takes risks, especially in the early 
stages of innovation, that the material self-interest of the party im-
perfectly secures. By increasing trust between innovator and investor 
or, equivalently, by making trust less necessary, law extends capital 
markets from personal to impersonal finance and increases the flow 
of funds to innovators. 
 Property and contract laws are the foundation of economic coop-
eration, including cooperation between innovator and investor. I refer 
to the property principle as the proposition, “People who create 
wealth can keep most of it.”4 When implemented, the property prin-
ciple motivates people to make wealth rather than take it. Legal in-
stitutions must protect the creators of wealth from predation by pri-
vate persons such as criminal gangs, scheming managers, dishonest 
accountants, appropriating bankers, and corrupt unions. In addition, 
the legal framework must protect wealth creators from predation by 
public officials such as tax collectors, planners, licensing authorities, 
regulators, and politicians.  
 A person who foresees that thieves will probably steal everything 
has little incentive to produce anything. Ineffective protection of 
property rights has devastating economic effects in the poorest na-
tions, where law fails to protect people who make wealth from preda-
tion by private persons and public officials. Consequently, instead of 
making wealth, people impoverish the nation by competing to take 
wealth from each other. To illustrate, producing and transporting 
diamonds in central Africa approaches the level of anarchy, so cen-
tral Africa produces few diamonds and receives much less than the 
world price for them.5 If anarchy were replaced by a secure system of 
property rights, central African nations could produce diamonds with 
better technology, export them through the regular channels of world 
trade, and receive the world price.  
 Unlike diamond thieves, criminals in Moscow who sell security do 
not want to take everything from their clients. In order to sell protec-
tion, there must be something to protect. Such criminals try to im-
pose a “security tax” that still leaves room for the shopkeeper to 
prosper. This example illustrates that private security of property is 
better than anarchy and worse than good state legal institutions.  
                                                                                                                      
 4. The property principle assumes that we can decide who made what. This is not so 
easy when people make things by cooperating and combining their resources. Later, I ex-
plain why I think that this objection is more philosophical than practical.  
 5. This Article does not touch on the heinous abuse of human rights. 
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 Besides motivation, making wealth requires coordinating the ef-
forts of different people through organizations and markets. People 
coordinate by saying what they will do and doing what they say. Ac-
cording to the contract principle, a person can voluntarily assume le-
gal liability for failing to do what he says. Legal liability helps people 
to rely on the word of others, especially people who are not friends or 
relatives. When people can rely on the word of others, they can ex-
tend their sphere of cooperation in time and space. 
 Conversely, ineffective enforcement in poor countries narrows the 
sphere of cooperation in time and space. Weak contract law impover-
ishes by keeping trade too local and keeping organizations insuffi-
ciently specialized. To illustrate, some businesses in Jakarta make 
cloth from cotton and sew it into clothing within a single factory. 
Gathering everyone into a single factory enables its owner to monitor 
everyone’s work. Better contract law would enable the factory owner 
to specialize in the activities that he does best and contract out the 
remaining activities. An enforceable contract can lower the cost of 
monitoring, which facilitates dispersed production, wider markets, 
and larger organizations. 
 In poor countries, property and contract law-on-the-books tend to 
be sound. Because of history, property and contract law-on-the-books 
in a poor country often closely resemble the law of a rich country. For 
example, property and contract law in India and Nigeria resemble 
English common law, and property and contract law in South Amer-
ica resemble the French and Spanish civil codes. Unfortunately, 
property and contract law-on-the-books in poor countries also tend to 
be ineffective. By “ineffective” I mean that property rights are vio-
lated and contracts are broken without victims having access to legal 
remedies. In my view, the most pervasive and fundamental defect in 
the legal framework of poor countries is inadequate enforcement of 
property and contract law.  
 To illustrate, Mexican courts assess interest against delays in col-
lecting a debt at rates below the market rate. Debtors, consequently, 
gain by using the law to delay repayment. One of Mexico’s richest 
businessmen, Ricardo Salinas, began to build his fortune by figuring 
out how to avoid courts and still collect debts from poor people who 
buy consumer durables. To collect the debts, he enlisted the help of 
the borrower’s relatives. The situation is worse in India where col-
lecting a debt through the courts takes years or even decades. In 
some countries, the judges regularly take bribes to decide a case. For 
example, an Indonesian friend told me that instead of trying cases, 
his country’s lower courts “auction” them.  
 As another example of the causes of ineffective private law, many 
countries have constitutions that guarantee a citizen’s right to a trial. 
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In Chile and some other Latin American countries, this right is in-
terpreted to mean that the court should not assess fees against the 
parties to a legal dispute. The absence of fees increases the quantity 
of cases. Heavy caseloads cause judges to dispose of most cases on the 
basis of written documents, without oral arguments in court.  
 Although there is not much oral argument in court in some Latin 
American countries, such as Argentina, the lawyers for the two par-
ties routinely speak to the judge about a case outside of court pro-
ceedings, which undermines the judge’s neutrality. Neutral judges 
resolve disputes based on law and facts, whereas biased judges re-
solve cases on unfair grounds, including personal relationships. To 
promote neutrality, many legal systems forbid the parties in a dis-
pute to communicate with the judge outside the courtroom. For ex-
ample, in the United States, an attorney is forbidden to have dinner 
with the judge who is deciding his case. The rule against ex parte 
communication assures that each party can hear all of the other 
side’s arguments in court and respond to them. In its absence, doubt 
about the judge’s neutrality creates uncertainty about property and 
contract rights, which burdens business activity. 
 Now I turn to the specialized laws that are often built on property 
and contracts, such as corporations, banking, securities, and bank-
ruptcy. I begin with corporate law. When people invest in a company 
that they do not control, they run the risk that the people who control 
it will expropriate their investment. Securing noncontrolling inves-
tors against expropriation requires effective corporate laws. Develop-
ing effective laws to secure noncontrolling stockholders is harder 
than securing noncontrolling bondholders, because of the essential 
difference between stocks and bonds. Stocks entitle their holders to a 
share of profits. The people who control a company can manipulate 
reported profits in ways that are difficult to detect and prove in court. 
The stock market cannot flourish in most poor countries because inef-
fective corporate and securities laws provide insufficient protection 
against manipulation of noncontrolling investors.  
 In contrast to stocks, bonds prescribe an exact repayment sched-
ule that the issuer must meet or else go bankrupt. The repayment ob-
ligation for bonds is easier for courts to enforce than the dividend 
sharing obligations for stocks. Consequently, finance in developing 
countries is skewed towards bonds rather than stocks. To illustrate, 
Ecuadorian investors in a recent year bought 150 times more bonds 
than stocks.  
 Like biological mutations, most new businesses fail, and a few 
succeed spectacularly. To induce investors to finance start-up busi-
nesses, the investors must enjoy a substantial fraction of the upside 
gain, which offsets the high likelihood that the business will fail. 
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Skewing finance towards bonds and away from stocks deprives inves-
tors of the upside gains, which makes them less likely to invest. Also, 
when entrepreneurs must borrow at fixed interest rates rather than 
borrowing against a share of future profits, their risk is greater. A 
larger stock market that permits businessmen to sell more stocks 
and fewer bonds would encourage entrepreneurs by allowing them to 
spread their risk. The skew in financing away from stocks dampens 
investment in start-ups and slows the pace of innovation.  
 In many poor communities, land is the most valuable asset. To 
borrow money and fund new businesses, entrepreneurs want to 
mortgage land. To mortgage land, the lender must have the legal 
power to seize land from a defaulting debtor and sell it to satisfy the 
debt. Legal obstacles that prevent lenders from repossessing land 
also prevent entrepreneurs from financing businesses by using land 
to secure loans. To illustrate, Indians on the Navajo Reservation in 
the Western United States often live in trailers rather than houses. 
The advantage of trailers over houses is that lenders can repossess 
trailers, whereas the Navajo courts will not allow outsiders to seize 
the house of a defaulting debtor. In places like the Navajo Reserva-
tion, solving this problem involves developing new law, not just en-
forcing existing law. Developing new law is tricky in this case, be-
cause the transfer of Navajo land to outsiders would quickly erode 
the social basis for the existence of the Navajo Nation.  
 I have explained that defects in property and contract law cause 
people to take wealth from each other, as illustrated by African dia-
monds and Moscow security. Similarly, state officials use public law 
to take wealth from its creators and keep it for themselves or give it 
to politically favored people. Unlike property and contract law, the 
defect is not just underenforcement. In addition, the defect in poor 
countries lies in law-on-the-books.  
 Two kinds of defects in public law produce bad results. First, pub-
lic law creates monopoly power as a way to transfer wealth from or-
dinary people to the friends of politicians. To illustrate, many devel-
oping countries have state agencies with monopoly power over the 
purchase and export of goods produced in the countryside. In princi-
ple, these agencies smooth fluctuations in world commodity prices. In 
practice, these agencies force rural producers to sell below the world 
price. Thus, Papua New Guinea has a coffee marketing board with 
the exclusive right to buy coffee beans from farmers. Licenses and 
regulations are two other techniques for the state to create monopoly 
power. When a business needs a compulsory license to operate, deni-
als of license applications restrict the entry of competitors and create 
monopoly profits for licensed businesses. Regulations can have the 
same consequences as licenses. When a business must conform to a 
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regulation to operate, regulations can be designed and administered 
to restrict the entry of competitors. 
 In the 1960s, British Railway workers sometimes paralyzed the 
system while stopping short of a strike by following every rule. Be-
sides creating monopoly, the second defect of public law-on-the-books 
is excessive regulation. Like “work-to-rule,” officials who enforce ex-
cessive regulations choke markets. To keep markets operating, en-
trepreneurs often have to bribe officials. Officials may burden mar-
kets by enforcing excessive regulations or accepting bribes to circum-
vent the rules, but either way the nation loses. 
 To illustrate, environmental regulations in the Lacandon Forest of 
southern Mexico are apparently more effective at generating bribes 
for environmental officials than at slowing the destruction of the for-
est. The main effect of these environmental regulations is allegedly to 
create a new source of bribes for the officials who do not enforce them 
and to increase the cost of lumbering by an amount equal to the cost 
of bribing officials.  
 Monopoly creation and overregulation often go together. To illus-
trate, a license may create monopoly profits for the licensee, who can 
use the monopoly profits to pay bribes or make political donations to 
the officials who grant licenses. Following the research of Hernando 
de Soto, researchers have documented the heavy regulatory burden 
to create a new company or enter a new line of business in poor coun-
tries.  
 While governments in poor countries overregulate in many areas, 
public law is underdeveloped and underenforced in other areas. For 
example, fish are harvested on Philippine reefs by spreading cyanide 
over the water. Cyanide stuns the fish for collection then sinks to the 
bottom and kills most living things. The Philippine reefs and the La-
candon Forest are just two examples where rapacious people plunder 
natural resources because environmental laws are ineffective. This 
behavior is rational for some individuals and irrational for society. To 
illustrate, overfishing is so severe in every major fishery in the world 
that the catch of fish would increase if less labor and capital were 
spent on fishing. Modern commercial fishing is analogous to a factory 
with too many workers: reducing the number of workers would in-
crease total output. 
VI.   INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEFICIT 
 I have explained some defects in the legal framework for innova-
tion in poor countries: ineffective law of property, contracts, and 
business, as well as overregulation by public law. Now I turn to the 
role of intellectual property in economic development. In order to 
analyze the law of intellectual property, I will explain two different 
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kinds of information. “Explicit information” refers to information that 
is easily reduced to a statement or formula that can be transmitted 
at low cost from one person to another. Explicit information espe-
cially involves science and technology, such as engineering plans, 
chemical processes, and computer programs. In contrast, “implicit in-
formation” refers to something that a person knows and cannot easily 
explain to others in a way that they can understand. To illustrate, a 
person may not be able to explain fully his hunch about an invest-
ment opportunity, his intuition about the reliability of a promise, or 
how the firm as a whole solves certain problems. Hunches, intuitions, 
and imbedded knowledge are forms of implicit information. Entre-
preneurs tend to rely on them when developing new organizations or 
markets.  
 Technological innovation is often explicit, and entrepreneurial in-
novation is often implicit. Economically successful innovations often 
combine technology and entrepreneurship. To illustrate, the inventor 
of a new machine may reduce the discovery to a patent that engi-
neers can understand, and the inventor may struggle to convince in-
vestors that buyers will want the new product made by the new ma-
chine. 
 Law protects property owners by awarding damages for past harm 
and injunctions against future trespass. To gain this protection, a 
property right must be definite enough to verify harm and trespass. 
Explicit information is often precise enough for this purpose. Conse-
quently, the law of intellectual property, whose two primary 
branches are patents and copyrights, protects many technological in-
novations.  
 For explicit innovations, the innovator is afraid to tell investors 
about his discovery for fear that they will steal it. The innovator 
must trust the investors enough to disclose explicit information to 
them before getting full payment. Intellectual property rights in 
technology help to secure this trust. Consequently, the law of intel-
lectual property is important for technological innovation. 
 Whereas innovators must guard against theft of explicit informa-
tion, they must struggle to make implicit information understood. 
For implicit information, the investor must trust the innovator 
enough to give him money before fully understanding the innovation. 
To illustrate, an insurance company may be unable to convince out-
side investors that it has found a better way to organize its sales 
force. 
 Like all property rights, patents and copyrights are only as good 
as the owner’s ability to enforce them. Intellectual property rights 
are harder to enforce than real property rights. To illustrate, Ameri-
cans steal much more software than real estate. Inefficiencies in en-
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forcing intellectual property rights in the United States are magni-
fied in most poor countries, where intellectual property protection is 
weak. 
 Implicit information is usually too imprecise for anyone to own, so 
the law of intellectual property seldom protects it. To illustrate, re-
cent attempts to extend patents to “business processes” in the United 
States have had little success and strong critics. Thus, an insurance 
company cannot patent a new way to organize its sales force. The law 
of intellectual property, consequently, is not so important for entre-
preneurial innovations. However, where intellectual property law 
fails, the law of trade secrets sometimes succeeds. 
 As mentioned, explicit information especially refers to science and 
technology, which educated people produce in laboratories and uni-
versities. Rich countries have relatively more educated people, well-
equipped laboratories, and superior universities. Consequently, ex-
plicit innovations occur more often in rich countries. For this reason, 
the law of patents, copyrights, and trade secrets is more important 
for economic growth in rich countries than in poor countries. In some 
cases, poor countries will do better by taking explicit innovations 
from rich countries instead of making them. For example, many 
Latin American countries have historically refused to recognize 
pharmaceutical patents. The citizens of these countries, conse-
quently, have enjoyed cheap generic medicine. Similarly, China has 
historically not suppressed pirated software, so Chinese citizens have 
enjoyed cheap copies of computer programs from abroad.  
 These practices, however, increasingly risk violating international 
agreements and provoking retaliation. In effect, rich countries have 
lowered tariffs against imports from poor countries in exchange for 
poor countries agreeing to protect the intellectual property of citizens 
in rich countries. When poor countries fail to protect intellectual 
property, the rich countries can retaliate by curtailing imports. Also, 
when poor countries fail to protect intellectual property rights, some 
domestic production in poor countries suffers. To illustrate, circula-
tion of illegally copied movies in China harms Chinese moviemakers, 
not just Hollywood. For these reasons, the advantage to poor coun-
tries of not protecting intellectual property may shrink or disappear. 
 Now I turn from explicit to implicit information. When competing 
in world markets, countries tend to specialize in those goods that 
they can produce more cheaply than other countries. Comparative 
advantage in cost especially comes from using cheap factors inten-
sively in production. The factor of production that poor countries 
have in abundance is cheap labor. The challenge is to fit low-wage 
workers into organizations that release their productivity. Meeting 
the challenge is not so much a problem of obtaining technology as us-
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ing it. Learning to use technology involves cooperating in new ways 
through innovations in organizations and markets. 
 To illustrate, a worker who emigrates from a poor country and 
finds a job in a rich country enjoys a sharp increase in wages, which 
reflects a sharp increase in productivity. The immigrant’s productiv-
ity increases sharply because his labor is imbedded in a better or-
ganization with better technology. To increase worker productivity, 
the poor country must improve its organization and marketing. For 
example, in 1942 four friends in India formed Asian Paints. Over the 
course of twenty-five years, Asian Paints became India’s largest paint 
company, and it now ranks among the top-ten decorative coatings 
companies in the world by sales. The founders of the company had to 
create an effective organization to take advantage of India’s rela-
tively low wage rates. Indian scientists and foreign companies pro-
vided the technology, but Indian entrepreneurs provided the organi-
zation. 
 Under modern conditions, good organizations can obtain technol-
ogy. The harder problem for poor countries is to develop good organi-
zation. That is why the problem of innovation in poor countries is less 
technological and more entrepreneurial. Entrepreneurial innovation, 
which refers to innovations in organizations and markets, is the most 
crucial form of innovation for economic growth in poor countries. En-
trepreneurial innovation mostly involves implicit information. Unlike 
explicit information, implicit information is relatively hard to trans-
mit, so it tends to remain within the innovator’s organization for 
some time. To reward entrepreneurs for implicit innovation, law pri-
marily needs to secure the rights of each organization to the value 
that it produces. This is a problem of enforcing material property 
rights, not the much harder problem of enforcing intellectual prop-
erty rights. To promote entrepreneurial innovation, poor countries 
need not extend intellectual property law to cover innovations in 
business organization. In the United States, patents have been ex-
tended to some types of innovations in business organization, and 
many economists regard granting these “business process patents” as 
an unfortunate mistake in United States patent policy. 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
 Economic innovation occurs when someone discovers a better way 
to make things or better things to make. Only a few people initially 
know about an innovation. Implementing an innovation requires 
combining private information with capital, which poses an inherent 
problem of trust between innovator and financier. Because officials 
should act on public information, industrial policy cannot help to 
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solve the problem. Instead, industrial policy is the state’s equivalent 
of churning a private portfolio.  
 Law helps to solve this problem by providing a framework for 
commitment and coordination built on an account of human nature. 
Economic rivalries among people are intense. Rivalries directed to-
wards making wealth enrich the nation, while rivalries directed to-
wards taking wealth impoverish it. Two fundamental principles di-
rect rivalries towards making wealth. The property principle asserts 
that people who make wealth can keep most of it. When private or 
public predators violate this principle, rivals are deflected from mak-
ing wealth to taking it. The contract principle enables people to 
commit to doing what they say, so they can coordinate behavior and 
achieve efficient scale in organizations and markets.  
 Responding to these facts, rich countries rely mostly on the pri-
vate sector as the engine of growth, with the public sector providing a 
framework of law and public goods. The best course for poor countries 
is to do the same. Unfortunately, many theories of economic devel-
opment regard poor countries as exceptions that require more state 
leadership and regulation. State-led growth causes industrial policy 
and administrative law to crowd out the law of property and con-
tracts. In the eighteenth century, Adam Smith caused an intellectual 
revolution by demonstrating that monopolies created by the state, in-
cluding those created indirectly through licenses and regulations, 
cost the public far more than the profits enjoyed by the beneficiaries. 
Adam Smith’s critique of the mercantilists in his day applies to much 
of development economics today.  
 All nations now have the opportunity to escape poverty by devel-
oping productive organizations. A good legal framework causes pro-
ductive organizations to develop naturally from competition among 
people. Most poor countries have good property and contract law-on-
the-books, but it is ineffective. Ineffective property and contract law 
is the worst defect in the laws of poor countries. Legal reform must 
aim to increase the effectiveness of private law and reduce regula-
tions in public law.  
 Moral principles about stealing and lying are abstract and vague, 
so their application to business is often indeterminate. Business law 
remedies the problem by stipulating good practices in detail. The best 
business law identifies the best business practices and raises them to 
the level of legal obligations. For example, some ways to organize a 
company are better than others, and good corporate law enforces the 
practices of good companies. I have already explained that entrepre-
neurial innovation begins with private information that becomes 
public later. I have also explained that experts, including lawyers 
and economists, cannot predict most entrepreneurial innovations. 
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Consequently, the best business practices tend to evolve in ways that 
judges and lawyers cannot predict. For this reason, judges and law-
yers who make business law often have to follow good business prac-
tice, not lead it.  
 To illustrate, Judge Mansfield modernized the English law of fi-
nancial instruments in the eighteenth century by understanding the 
best practices that merchant banks actually followed, then raising 
these practices to the level of the common law. Similarly, Karl Lle-
wellyn followed the same philosophy as Mansfield when he organized 
the Uniform Commercial Code project, which produced the most im-
portant business law in twentieth-century America.  
 I use the term “market modernization” to refer to the process of 
raising the best business practices to the level of law. Market mod-
ernization requires business law’s development to follow innovations 
in markets and organization. Innovation occurs faster when the mar-
ket leads and the law follows for two reasons. First, the trajectory of 
entrepreneurial innovation is unpredictable from public information. 
Since law is based on public information, business law develops in re-
sponse to business innovations after they become public knowledge. 
The information known by legal officials lags behind innovations in 
business practice, so innovation occurs faster when market practice 
leads and the law adapts to it. Second, learning about changes in law 
imposes heavy transaction costs on businesses. Since businessmen do 
not have time to become lawyers, they mostly use morality and busi-
ness norms as their guide for what the law requires. As long as they 
conform to morality and accepted business practice, they hope to re-
main comfortably within the law. When they want to engage in a 
sharp practice that violates morality or accepted business practice, 
they consult a lawyer. However, if law departs from morality and 
business practice, businessmen must constantly consult lawyers 
when developing business strategy. I have explained that when the 
law follows business norms, business can proceed with relatively low 
transaction costs, and when law departs from business norms, the 
transaction costs of business increase sharply.  
